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Abstract—We construct locally decodable codes (LDCs) to
correct insertion-deletion errors in the setting where the sender
and receiver share a secret key or where the channel is resource-
bounded. Our constructions rely on a so-called “Hamming-to-
InsDel” compiler (Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky, ITS ’15 &
Block et al., FSTTCS ’20), which compiles any locally decodable
Hamming code into a locally decodable code resilient to insertion-
deletion (InsDel) errors. While the compilers were designed for
the classical coding setting, we show that the compilers still work
in a secret key or resource-bounded setting. Applying our results
to the private key Hamming LDC of Ostrovsky, Pandey, and
Sahai (ICALP ’07), we obtain a private key InsDel LDC with
constant rate and polylogarithmic locality. Applying our results
to the construction of Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou (ITC ’20),
we obtain similar results for resource-bounded channels; i.e., a
channel where computation is constrained by resources such as
space or time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Error-correcting codes that are resilient to insertion-deletion
(InsDel) errors have been a major focus in recent advances in
coding theory [Lev66, KLM04, GW17, HS17, GL19, GL18,
HSS18, HS18, BGZ18, CJLW18, CHL+19, CJLW19, HRS19,
Hae19, SB19, CGHL20, CL20, GHS20, LTX20]. Such codes
are a generalization of classical Hamming codes to handle the
case where symbols at arbitrary positions in the codeword can
be inserted or deleted. Insertion-deletion codes over alphabet
Σ are described by an encoding function Enc : Σk → ΣK and
decoding function Dec : Σ∗ → Σk such that for a message
x ∈ Σk, if y′ ∈ Σ∗ such that the edit distance between
Enc(x) and y′ is at most 2ρK, then Dec(y′) = x. A core
research direction is building codes with high information rate
k/K that are robust to a large constant fraction ρ of insertion-
deletion errors. Only recently have efficient (i.e., polynomial
time encoding and decoding) InsDel codes with asymptotically
good (i.e., constant) information rate and error tolerance been
well-understood [HS18, Hae19, HRS19, LTX20, GHS20].
Even less understood are locally decodable codes for in-
sertions and deletions: such error-correcting codes admit su-
per efficient (e.g., polylogarithmic time) decoding algorithms
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which, by querying few locations into a received word, can
recover portions of the original message. Inspired by locally
decodable codes (LDCs) for Hamming errors [STV99, KT00],
Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky [OPC15] introduced the
notion of locally decodable InsDel codes (InsDel LDC). A
code C[K, k] = (Enc,Dec) is an (ℓ, ρ, p)-InsDel LDC if the
decoding function Dec is a randomized algorithm that makes
at most ℓ queries to the received word and, if the edit distance
between an encoded message Enc(x) and a received word
y′ is at most 2ρ · |Enc(x)|, then Dec on input i outputs xi
with probability at least p. Here, ℓ is the locality of the
code, ρ is the error rate, and p is the success probability.
While LDCs for Hamming errors have been studied for several
decades [KW03, Yek08, Efr09, DGY10, Yek12, KS16, KM-
RZS17], the study of InsDel LDCs is scarce. Besides the
results of Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky [OPC15] and
Block et al. [BBG+20], only Haeupler and Shahrasbi [HS18],
to the best of our knowledge, consider locality in the building
of synchronization strings, which are an important component
of optimal InsDel codes.
Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky [OPC15] and Block
et al. [BBG+20] both give a so-called “Hamming-to-InsDel”
compiler: given any classical Hamming LDC as input, this
compiler outputs an InsDel LDC. This reduction preserves the
information rate and the error rate of the original Hamming
LDC (up to constant factors), and the locality only grows
by a polylogarithmic factor (in the length of a codeword).
Note this reduction holds for any classical Hamming LDC.
However, there have been recent advances in examining
Hamming LDCs in non-classical [OPS07, CLZ20, BKZ20]
or relaxed [BGGZ19] settings. For example, there is a line
of work studying Hamming codes in which the channel is
computationally bounded [Lip94, MPSW05, GS16, SS16]. In
such settings the corruption pattern is selected adversarially by
a resource bounded channel (e.g., the channel is probabilistic
polynomial time), or has other resource constraints such as
space or computation depth (i.e., sequential time), restricting
the computations that can be performed. It has been argued
that any real world communication channel can be reasonably
modeled as a resource-bounded channel [Lip94, BKZ20].
The notion of resource-bounded channels is well-motivated
by channels in the real world, which all have some sort of
limitations on their computations, and one can reasonably
expect error patterns encountered in nature to be modeled by






















algorithm. Thus, the study of Hamming and InsDel codes in
non-classical and relaxed settings is well-motivated.
Mirroring the Hamming code results, the non-classical and
relaxed settings offer much better tradeoffs than classical
LDCs, at the cost of different assumptions in the adversarial
models, or by allowing the decoder to fail on a small fraction
of inputs. For example, codes constructed using secret-key
cryptography (i.e., the encoder and decoder share a secret
key) admit constant-rate Hamming LDCs with polylogarithmic
locality (in the security parameter) [OPS07]. Similarly, when
assuming the adversarial channel is resource-constrained in
some way (e.g., the channel is a low-depth circuit), there are
constructions of constant-rate Hamming LDCs with polyloga-
rithmic locality [BKZ20]. Further, it is not out of the question
for a shared secret-key assumption, and it has been argued
that resource-constrained adversarial channels can model real-
world channels reasonably well [Lip94, BKZ20]. Thus we ask
Can we extend non-classical Hamming LDCs to the
insertion-deletion setting?
A. Our Results
We answer the question in the affirmative for two classes
of non-classical Hamming LDCs. First, we consider private
locally decodable codes (private LDCs). Introduced by Ostro-
vsky, Pandey, and Sahai [OPS07], private LDCs leverage cryp-
tographic assumptions to construct locally decodable Ham-
ming codes against probabilistic polynomial time adversaries.
In particular, private LDCs leverage a (pseudorandom) secret
key that is shared between the encoder and the decoder,
and assumes that any adversary does not receive this secret
key. These codes are additionally parameterized by a security
parameter λ and a secret key generation function Gen. Second,
we consider Hamming LDCs that are secure against resource-
bounded adversaries. Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20]
introduce resource-bounded LDCs as an extension of clas-
sical Hamming codes in resource-bounded settings [Lip94,
MPSW05, GS16, SS16]. These LDCs are secure against any
class of adversaries C that admit some safe function that is
uncomputable by any adversary A ∈ C. For example, in the
(parallel) random oracle model any polynomial time algorithm
running in sequential time T provably cannot evaluate the
function HT+1(·) so the function would be a safe function
against the class C of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
with sequential time at most T .
We obtain a binary private InsDel LDC from any private
Hamming LDC and a binary resource-bounded InsDel LDC
from any resource-bounded Hamming LDC by applying the
Hamming-to-InsDel compiler of Block et al. [BBG+20].
Informal Theorem 1 (see Theorem 1): Let C[K, k] be an
(ℓ, ρ, p)-private Hamming LDC. There exists a binary (ℓ ·
polylog(K),Θ(ρ), O(p))-private InsDel LDC with codeword
length Θ(K).
Ostrovsky, Pandey, and Sahai [OPS07] construct a private
Hamming LDC over any constant-sized alphabet that achieves
constant-rate, ω(log(λ)) locality, constant error rate, and suc-
cess probability 1 − negl(λ), where λ is the security param-
eter and negl(·) = o(1/|p(·)|) for any non-zero polynomial
p. Combining [OPS07] with Informal Theorem 1 yields a
constant-rate private InsDel LDC with polylogarithmic locality,
constant error rate, and high success probability.
Informal Theorem 2 (see Theorem 2): Let C[K, k] be an
(ℓ, ρ, p)-Hamming LDC secure against class C. There exists a
binary (ℓ·polylog(K),Θ(ρ), O(p))-InsDel LDC secure against
class C with codeword length Θ(K).
Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20] recently construct a
Hamming LDC over any constant-sized alphabet, in the ran-
dom oracle model (i.e., the encoding and decoding functions
make use of a cryptographic hash function), that achieves
constant-rate, polylog(λ) locality, constant error rate, and
success probability 1 − negl(λ), for security parameter λ. In
the random oracle model their construction provably yields
a secure code for any channel class C admiting a safe
function. Combining [BKZ20] with Informal Theorem 2 yields
a constant rate InsDel LDC secure against class C with
polylogarithmic locality, constant error rate, and high success
probability.
B. Technical Overview
The key technical component of our constructions is the
use of a “Hamming-to-InsDel” compiler [OPC15, BBG+20]
which transforms any classical Hamming LDC to an InsDel
LDC with polylogarithmic blow-up in the locality. The com-
piler of Block et al. [BBG+20] is a reproving of Ostrovsky
and Paskin-Cherniavsky’s result, using different techniques
and analysis. For simplicity, we use the compiler of Block
et al. in this work, which we refer to as the BBGKZ compiler.
The BBGKZ compiler at its core consists of two functions:
Compile and RecoverBit. The function Compile takes as
input a codeword y ∈ ΣK that is resilient to ρ-fraction
of Hamming errors and outputs a codeword Y ∈ {0, 1}n
that is resilient to ρ′-fraction of insertion-deletion errors. The
compiled encoding function operates as follows: it encodes
a message x using the given Hamming LDC to obtain the
Hamming codeword y, then it applies the function Compile
to y and outputs the final InsDel codeword Y . The function
RecoverBit, when given query access to some Y ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗,
on input i makes polylog(|Y ′|) queries to Y ′ and attempts
to recover yi, the ith bit of the Hamming codeword y. The
BBGKZ compiler guarantees that if ED(Y, Y ′) ≤ ρ′ then for
most indices i ∈ [K], RecoverBit outputs the correct bit yi
with high probability.
The challenge in applying the BBGKZ compiler to a private
Hamming LDC or a resource-bounded LDC is that we cannot
assume that decoding will be correct for every corrupted
codeword with small Hamming distance. Instead, we require
that the channel cannot produce a codeword which fools
the decoding algorithm except with negligible probability. In
particular, if y is our encoding of a message x then we say
that a corrupted codeword y′ fools the decoder if:
1) the (Hamming/Edit) distance between y and y′ is small;
and
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2) for some index i, the probability that the local decoder,
given oracle access to y′, outputs the correct bit xi is less
than p.
The security requirement is that any adversary A produces
such a fooling codeword y′ with probability at most ε. The
difficulty here is proving that applying the BBGKZ compiler
to a private code or resource-bounded code preserves the
security of the underlying code. Proving the security of our
compiled private/resource-bounded code lies in the algorithm
RecoverBit: given an adversary A against the compiled
InsDel code, we construct a new adversary A′ against the
original Hamming code which does the following:
1) obtains challenge message x and Hamming codeword y;
2) obtains InsDel codeword Y = Compile(y);
3) obtains Y ′ ← A(x, Y ); and
4) obtains y′j ← RecoverBitY
′
(j) for all j.
Applying the key property of RecoverBit one can show
that the Hamming distance between y and y′ is suitably
small. Furthermore, if Y ′ fools our local InsDel decoder
then one can argue that (w.h.p.) y′ fools our local Hamming
decoder. Thus, the compiler transforms secret key Hamming
LDCs into secret key InsDel LDCs and resource bounded
Hamming LDCs into resource bounded InsDel LDCs. For
resource bounded channels, there is another subtlety we must
account for. Our Hamming adversary A′ requires slightly
more resources than the original InsDel adversary A; i.e., we
need to run RecoverBit for each index j (though this can
be accomplished in parallel to minimize computation depth).
Thus, to obtain an InsDel LDC secure against the channel
class C we need to start with a Hamming LDC secure against
a slightly larger class C′.
C. Related Work
Levenstein [Lev66] initiated the study of codes for inser-
tions and deletions. Since this initiation, there has been a
large body of works examining InsDel codes (see surveys
[Slo02, Mit08, MBT10]). Recently, [SB19] constructed k-
deletion correcting binary codes with optimal redundancy,
which was extended to systematic binary codes and q-ary
codes in [SGB20a, SGB20b]. This line of work answered
long standing open problems in the construction of k-deletion
correcting codes with optimal redundancy. Random codes with
positive information rate and correcting a large fraction of
deletion errors were studied in [KLM04, GW17], and effi-
ciently encodable and decodable codes with constant rate and
resilient to a constant fraction of insertion-deletion errors were
studied extensively in [SZ99, GW17, HS17, CJLW18, HS18,
CHL+19, GL19, BGZ18, CGHL20, CL20, GHS20]. Recently,
there has been interest in extending “list-decoding” to the
setting of InsDel codes. These codes are resilient to a larger
fraction of insertion-deletion errors at the cost of outputting
a small list of potential codewords (i.e., the loss of unique
decoding) [HSS18, LTX20, GHS20]. Another direction due to
Haeupler and Shahrasbi [HS18] involves constructing explicit
synchronization strings which can be “locally decoded” in the
following sense: each index of the string can be computed
using values located at a small number of other indices.
These explicit and locally decodable synchronization strings
are used to imply near linear time interactive coding schemes
for insertion-deletion errors.
Cheng, Li and Zheng [CLZ20] propose the notion of
locally decodable codes with randomized encoding, in both
the Hamming and edit distance regimes. They study such
codes in various settings, including where the encoder and
decoder share randomness, or the channel is oblivious to the
codeword, and hence adds error patterns non-adaptively. For
insertion-deletion errors they obtain codes with K = O(k) or
K = k · log(k) and polylog(k) locality for message length k.
Blocki, Gandikota, Grigorescu, and Zhou [BGGZ19] con-
struct relaxed locally correctable and locally decodable Ham-
ming codes in computationally bounded channels. Here, local
correction states that a corrupt codeword c′ can be corrected
to codeword c by only querying c′ at a bounded number of
locations, and relaxed means that the correcting or decoding
algorithm is allowed to output the value ⊥ for a small fraction
of inputs. Their construction requires a public parameter setup
for a collision-resistant hash function, and they obtain relaxed
binary locally correctable and decodable Hamming codes
with constant information rate and polylogarithmic locality.
Recently, Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20] introduced
Hamming LDCs that are secure against resource-bounded
adversaries, in the random oracle model. Here, they construct
codes (in the random oracle model) which are resilient to
classes of adversaries C for which there exists a function f
that is uncomputable by any A ∈ C. They obtain explicit
Hamming LDCs with constant information rate and polyloga-
rithmic locality against various classes C of resource-bounded
adversaries.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We let λ ∈ N denote the security parameter. For n ∈ Z+,
we let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. A function ϑ : N →
R≥0 is said to be negligible if ϑ(n) = o(1/|p(n)|) for any
fixed non-zero polynomial p. We write PPT as a shorthand for
probabilistic polynomial time. For any (randomized) algorithm
A, we let y ← A(x) denote the result of running A on some
input x.
We consider the fractional Hamming distance and the frac-
tional Edit Distance metrics, which we denote by HAM and
ED, respectively. For two strings x, y ∈ ΣK for some K, we
define HAM(x, y) := |{i : xi ̸= yi}i∈[K]|/K. For two strings
x ∈ ΣK and y ∈ Σ∗, we define ED(x, y) is the minimum
number of insertions and deletions required to transform x
into y (or vice versa), normalized by 2K.
Definition 1 (Error-correcting Codes): A coding scheme
C[K, k, q1, q2] = (Enc,Dec) is a pair of encoding and decod-
ing algorithms Enc : Σk1 → ΣK2 and Dec : Σ∗2 → Σk1 , where
|Σi| = qi. A code C[K, k, q1, q2] is a (ρ, dist) error-correcting
code for ρ ∈ [0, 1] and fractional distance dist if for all x ∈ Σk1
and y ∈ Σ∗2 such that dist(Enc(x), y) ≤ ρ, we have that
Dec(y) = x. Here, ρ is the error rate of C. If q1 = q2, we
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simply denote this by C[K, k, q1]. If dist = HAM, then C is a
Hamming code; if dist = ED, then C is an insertion-deletion
code (InsDel code).
Definition 2 (Locally Decodable Codes): A coding scheme
C[K, k, q1, q2] = (Enc,Dec) is an (ℓ, ρ, p, dist)-locally de-
codable code (LDC) if for all x ∈ Σk1 and y ∈ Σ∗2 such that
dist(Enc(x), y) ≤ ρ, the algorithm Dec, with query access to
word y, on input index i ∈ [k], makes at most ℓ queries to y
and outputs xi with probability at least p over the randomness
of the decoder. Here, ℓ is the locality of C and p is the success
probability.
Private locally-decodable codes were introduced by Ostro-
vsky, Pandey, and Sahai [OPS07]. The encoding and decoding
algorithms of these codes additionally share a secret key that
is hidden from any adversarial channel. Intuitively, these codes
ensure that (except with small probability) any channel who
does not have the secret key will fail to produce a corrupted
codeword y′ which fools the local decoder.
Definition 3 (One-Time Private LDC): Let λ be the security
parameter. A code C[K, k, q1, q2, λ] consisting of a tuple of
PPT algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a (ℓ, ρ, p, ε,dist)-one time
private locally decodable code (private LDC) if:
• Gen(1λ) is the key generation algorithm that takes 1λ as
input and outputs a secret key sk ∈ {0, 1}∗, for security
parameter λ;
• Enc : Σk1 ×{0, 1}
∗ → ΣK2 is the encoding algorithm that
takes as input a message x ∈ Σk1 and a secret key sk and
outputs a codeword y ∈ ΣK2 ; and
• Decy
′
: {0, 1}log k × {0, 1}∗ → Σ1 is the decoding algo-
rithm that takes as input index i ∈ [k] and secret key
sk, and is additionally given query access to a corrupted
codeword y′ ∈ ΣK′2 and outputs b ∈ Σ1 after making at
most ℓ queries to y′.
We define a predicate Fool(y′, ρ, p, sk, x, y) = 1 if and only if
1) dist(y, y′) ≤ ρ; and
2) ∃i ∈ [k] such that Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi] < p, where the
probability is taken over the random coins of Dec.
We require that for all adversaries A and all x ∈ Σk1 ,
Pr[Fool(A(y), ρ, p, sk, x, y) = 1] ≤ ε,
where y ← Enc(x, sk) and the probability is taken over
the random coins of A and Gen and Enc (if encoding is
randomized).
For all of our code definitions, when q2 = 2 we say that
the code is a binary code.
A. Codes for Resource-Bounded Channels
Recently, Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20] studied
error-correcting codes against channels which have some re-
source bound; e.g., the channel is a low-depth circuit, or is a
one-tape Turing machine. Intuitively, these codes ensure that
(except with small probability) any adversary with insufficient
resources will fail to produce a corrupt codeword y′ which
fools the local decoder.
Definition 4 (C-secure LDC): A code C[K, k, q1, q2] =
(Enc,Dec) is a (ℓ, ρ, p, ε,dist,C)-locally decodable code
against class C if Dec takes as input index i ∈ [k], is addi-
tionally given query access to a corrupted codeword y′ ∈ ΣK′2 ,
and outputs b ∈ Σ1 after making at most ℓ queries to y′. We
define predicate Fool(y′, ρ, p, x, y) = 1 if and only if
1) dist(y, y′) ≤ ρ; and
2) ∃i ∈ [k] such that Pr[Decy
′
(i) = x1] < p,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of Dec;
otherwise Fool(y′, ρ, p, x, y) = 0. We require that for all
adversaries A ∈ C and all x ∈ Σk1 ,
Pr[Fool(A(y), ρ, p, y) = 1] ≤ ε,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and
the generation of the codeword y ← Enc(x).
B. Hamming-to-InsDel Compiler
Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky [OPC15] give a com-
piler which transforms any Hamming LDC to an InsDel
LDC with a polylogarithmic blowup in locality. Block et al.
[BBG+20] give another compiler which transforms any Ham-
ming LDC into an InsDel LDC with polylogarithmic blow-
up in locality, reproving the result of [OPC15] with different
techniques and analysis. We use the compiler of Block et al.
in this work.
Let C = (Enc,Dec) be a Hamming LDC. Then the
compiler works as follows. The compiled encoder is defined as
Encf(x) := Compile(Enc(x)) for any message x. The decoder
Decf contains a subroutine RecoverBit which, given query
access to some Y ′ ∈ {0, 1}n
′
, on input index i makes at
most O(log4(n′)) queries and with high probability recovers
the ith-bit of c correctly for most indices of c = Enc(x) as
long as ED(Y, Y ′) is sufficiently small. The decoder Decf
then runs Dec and simulates oracle access to c by using
algorithm RecoverBit. We formally capture the properties
of the compiler in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Block et al. [BBG+20]): There exist functions
Compile and RecoverBit such that for any constant ρ > 0
and any Hamming LDC C[K, k, q1, q2] = (Enc,Dec) with
locality ℓ, there exists ρf = Θ(ρ) such that for any message x
and any c′ with ED(c′, y) ≤ ρf for y = Compile(Enc(x)) ∈
{0, 1}∗:
1) Decf has locality ℓ·O(log4(K ·log(q2))) and |y| = Θ(K ·
log(q2));
2) For c′′ = RecoverBitY
′
(1) ◦ · · · ◦ RecoverBitY ′(K ·
log(q2)), we have Pr[Decc
′
f (i) = xi] ≥ Pr[Dec
c′′(i) =
xi]− ϑ1(K · log(q2)); and
3) if ED(c′,Encf(x)) ≤ ρf then, except with probability
ϑ2(K · log(q2)), HAM(c′′,Enc(x)) ≤ ρ.
Here, ϑ1 and ϑ2 are fixed negligible functions, Compile is
computable in parallel time polylog(K), and c′′ is computable
in parallel time polylog(K).
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III. ONE-TIME PRIVATE LOCALLY DECODABLE CODES
FOR INSERTION-DELETION CHANNELS
Theorem 1: Let C[K, k, q1, q2, λ] be a (ℓ, ρ, p, ε,HAM)-one
time private Hamming LDC for constants ρ, p > 0. There
exists a binary code Cf [n, k, q1, 2] that is a (ℓf , ρf , pf , εf ,ED)-
one time private InsDel LDC, where ℓf = ℓ ·O(log4(n)), ρf =
Θ(ρ), pf < p, εf = ε/(1 − (pf/p) − (ϑ1(n)/p) − ϑ2(n)),
and n = Θ(K · log(q2)). Here, ϑ1, ϑ2 are fixed negligible
functions.
Proof: Let C[K, k, q1, q2, λ] = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a
(ℓ, ρ, p, ε,HAM)-one time private Hamming LDC. We define
Genf(1
λ) := Gen(1λ). Then for any message x and secret
key sk we define Encf(x, sk) := Compile(Enc(x, sk)). Fixing
the secret key sk and applying Lemma 1 to the encod-
ing scheme, we see that Decf has locality ℓ · O(log4(n))
and the output length of Encf is n = Θ(K log q2) bits.
The main challenge is proving the security. Suppose to-
wards contradiction that there exists an adversary Af such
that Pr[Fool(Af(Y ), ρf , pf , sk, x, Y ) = 1] > εf for Y ←
Encf(x, sk). Then we construct an adversary A such that
Pr[Fool(A(y), ρ, p, sk, x, y) = 1] > ε for y ← Enc(x, sk).
Adversary A works as follows:
1) A obtains as input x, y, λ, ρ, p, k, and K, where y =
Enc(x, sk);
2) A then obtains Y = Compile(y); and
3) A then obtains Y ′ ← Af(x, Y, λ, ρf , pf , k, n).
By assumption ED(Y, Y ′) ≤ ρf and with probability at least
εf there exists index i ∈ [k] such that
Pr[DecY
′
f (i, sk) = xi] < pf .
A then outputs word
y′ = RecoverBitY
′
(1) ◦ · · · ◦ RecoverBitY
′
(K · log(q2)).
Suppose that Fool(Y ′, ρf , pf , sk, x, Y ) = 1. Then we have
that ED(Y, Y ′) ≤ ρf and there exists i ∈ [k] such that
Pr[DecY
′
f (i, sk) = xi] < pf .
By Lemma 1, we have that HAM(y, y′) ≤ ρ with probability




f (i, sk) = xi]
≥ Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi]− ϑ1(n),
where the randomness of the second term is taken over the
coins of Dec and the coins used by RecoverBit to generate
y′, and the randomness of the first term is taken only over the
coins of Decf . Define the predicate Bp(y′) = 1 if and only if
Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi] < p, and Bp(y′) = 0 otherwise, where
the probability is taken over Dec’s coins. Let α = Pr[Bp(y′)],
where the probability is taken over the random coins used to
generate y′ from Y ′. Then we have that
Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi] ≥ p(1− α).
This implies that α > 1 − (pf/p) − (ϑ1(n)/p). Now con-
sider two events FHAM = Fool(y′, ρ, p, sk, x, y) and FED =
Fool(Y ′, ρf , pf , sk, x, Y ). Then
Pr[FHAM = 1] ≥ Pr[FED = 1] · Pr[FHAM = 1|FED = 1].
By assumption we have that Pr[FED = 1] > εf . Further, by
Definition 3, FHAM = 1 if and only if HAM(y, y′) ≤ ρ and
there exists i ∈ [k] such that Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi] < p. Since
FED = 1, we have that ED(Y, Y ′) ≤ ρf , and thus by Lemma 1
we have that HAM(y, y′) ≤ ρ with probability at least 1 −
ϑ2(n). Thus
Pr[FHAM = 1|FED = 1] ≥ 1− ϑ2(n)− (1− α)
and α > 1− (pf/p)− (ϑ1(n)/p). Therefore we have that
Pr[FHAM = 1] > εf · (1− (pf/p)− (ϑ1(n)/p)− ϑ2(n)),
which is a contradiction since the right hand side of the above
equation is equal to ε.
IV. LOCALLY DECODABLE CODES FOR
RESOURCE-BOUNDED INSERTION-DELETION CHANNELS
To construct LDCs for resource-bounded InsDel channels,
we first need to introduce the notion of closure between
algorithms classes. Let C be a class of parallel algorithms
running in at most sequential time T and maximum space
usage S. For any A ∈ C, let B = Reduce(A) be a reduction
from algorithm A to B. We say the class of algorithms C′ is
the closure of C with respect to Reduce if C′ is the minimum
class of algorithms such that Reduce(A) ∈ C′ for all A ∈ C.
In our context, for parameter N we define ReduceN as a
sequential time N ·polylog(N) reduction that can be executed
in parallel for sequential time polylog(N). Parallel execution
incurs an additional N · polylog(N) space overhead, and
sequential execution incurs an additional polylog(N) space
overhead. Thus, if C is the class of all parallel PPT algorithms
running in sequential time T , then C(N) is some class of
parallel PPT algorithms running in time T + polylog(N).
Theorem 2: Let C be the class of parallel PPT algo-
rithms running in sequential time T and space S, and let
C[K, k, q1, q2] = (Enc,Dec) be a (ℓ, ρ, p, ε,HAM,C(n))-LDC
for constants ρ, p > 0 and n = O(K · log(q2)). There exists a
binary code Cf [n, k, q1, 2] that is a (ℓf , ρf , pf , εf ,ED,C)-LDC
against class C, where ℓf = ℓ ·O(log4(n)), ρf = Θ(ρ), pf < p,
and εf = ε/(1 − (pf/p) − (ϑ1(n)/p) − ϑ2(n)). Here, ϑ1, ϑ2
are fixed negligible functions.
Proof: The proof follows nearly identically to the proof
of Theorem 1; namely, we obtain Cf in an identical manner
by using the compiler of Lemma 1 with the code C defined
above. The main challenge again is the security proof: given
adversary Af ∈ C such that Pr[Fool(A(Y ), ρf , pf , x, Y ) =
1] > εf for Y ← Encf(x), we construct an adversary
A ∈ C(n) such that Pr[Fool(A(y), ρ, p, x, y) = 1] > ε
for y ← Enc(x). Adversary A is constructed identically
as in the proof of Theorem 1, except now the constructed
adversary only yields a contradiction if we can show that
A ∈ C(n). By Lemma 1, we have that Compile is a
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polylog(K) = polylog(n) parallel time algorithm, and y′ =
RecoverBitY
′
(1) ◦ · · · ◦ RecoverBitY ′(K log q2) is com-
putable in polylog(n) parallel time. Finally, Compile and
RecoverBit are run independent of the adversary Af , we
have that the total parallel time of A is T +polylog(n), which
implies A ∈ C(n), yielding our contradiction.
Remark 1: We focus on a simple reduction, but Reduce
can be defined in various different ways, so long as for any
Af ∈ C, it holds that constructed adversary A ∈ C.
V. EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTIONS
As an application of our main results, we give two explicit
constructions.
A. Private InsDel Locally Decodable Code Construc
First, we use Theorem 1 with the one-time private Hamming
LDC of Ostrovsky, Pandey, and Sahai [OPS07]. For security
parameter λ and fixed negligible functions ϑ1, ϑ2, their code
has constant-rate, locality ω(log(λ)), constant error-rate, suc-
cess probability 1− ϑ1(λ), and security ε = ϑ2(λ).
Corollary 1: Let ℓf := ℓf(λ, n) = ω(log(λ) · O(log4(n)).
There exists a binary code Cf [n, k, q1, 2, λ] that is a
(ℓf , ρf , pf , εf)-one time private InsDel LDC with constant in-
formation rate k/n = Θ(1), where , ρf = Θ(1), pf = Θ(1),
and εf ≤ ς(λ, n). Here, ς is a fixed negligible function.
Both the OPS one-time private Hamming LDC and our
constructed one-time private InsDel LDC are secure against
information theoretic adversaries, so long as the secret key is
picked uniformly at random. However, it is possible to also
pick the secret key in a psuedo-random manner and obtain
security against any class of PPT adversaries, assuming the
existence of one-way functions.
Ovstrovsky, Pandey, and Sahai also give a construction of
a private locally decodable code that is secure even when
the adversary is given access to polynomially-many (in the
security parameter) codewords (i.e., it is not one-time). The
construction relies on a family of psuedo-random functions
and is therefore secure against any class of PPT adversaries,
assuming the existence of one-way functions. We emphasize
that applying our compiler on this “multi-time” private Ham-
ming code yields a secure “multi-time” private InsDel code.
Definition 5: Let λ be the security parameter. A code
C[K, k, q1, q2, λ] consisting of a tuple of PPT algorithms
(Gen,Enc,Dec) is a (ℓ, ρ, p, dist)-private locally decodable
code if:
• Gen(1λ) is the key generation algorithm that takes 1λ as
input and outputs a secret key sk ∈ {0, 1}∗, for security
parameter λ;
• Enc : Σk1 ×{0, 1}
∗ → ΣK2 is the encoding algorithm that
takes as input a message x ∈ Σk1 and a secret key sk and
outputs a codeword y ∈ ΣK2 ; and
• Decy
′
: {0, 1}log k × {0, 1}∗ → Σ1 is the decoding algo-
rithm that takes as input index i ∈ [k] and secret key
sk, and is additionally given query access to a corrupted
codeword y′ ∈ ΣK′2 and outputs b ∈ Σ1 after making at
most ℓ queries to y′.
• Let Fool be a predicate such that Fool(y′, ρ, p, sk, x, y) =
1 if and only if 1) dist(y, y′) ≤ ρ; and 2) ∃i ∈ [k]
such that Pr[Decy
′
(i, sk) = xi] < p, where the
probability is taken over the random coins of Dec;
and Fool(y′, ρ, p, sk, x, y) = 0 otherwise. Consider the
priv-LDC-Game defined in Fig. 1. We require that for all
PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ε(·)
such that
Pr[priv-LDC-Game(A, C, 1λ,Fool) = 1] ≤ ε(λ).
priv-LDC-Game(A, C, 1λ,Fool) :
Input: A PPT adversary A, a locally decodable code
C[K, k, q1, q2, λ] with PPT algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec), se-
curity parameter 1λ, and predicate Fool.
1) Obtain sk← Gen(1λ) and share sk with Enc and Dec.
Note A is not given sk.
2) For i ∈ [h], where h = poly(k) is an integer:
a) xi ← A(1λ, (x1, y1), . . . (xi−1, yi−1)).
b) yi ← Enc(xi; sk);
c) y′i ← A(1λ, (x1, y1), . . . (xi, yi)).
The output of priv-LDC-Game is 1 if there exists i ∈ [h]
such that Fool(y′i, ρ, p, sk, xi, yi) = 1; else priv-LDC-Game
outputs 0.
Fig. 1. Definition of priv-LDC-Game.
Remark 2: Definition 5 differs slightly the original definition
proposed in Ovstrovsky, Pandey, and Sahai [OPS07] in that
we allow the attacker to output a corrupted codeword y′i
in every round i ≤ h, while in [OPS07] the attacker only
attempts to corrupt the codeword in the last round. However,
the two definitions are equivalent, up to a 1/ poly(λ) loss in
the security. In particular, an attacker that breaks Definition 5
can efficiently be transformed into an attacker that breaks the
definition from [OPS07] i.e., we simply guess the index i′ ≤ h
of the first round in which the attacker is successful.
For security parameter λ, the “multi-time” private Hamming
code of [OPS07] has constant rate, locality ω(log2(λ)), con-
stant error-rate, and success probability 1− negl(λ), for some
negligible function.
Corollary 2: Assume that one-way functions exist and let
ℓf := ℓf(λ, n) = ω(log
2(λ) ·O(log4(n)). There exists a binary
code Cf [n, k, q1, 2, λ] that is a (ℓf , ρf , pf)-private InsDel LDC
(as per Definition 5) with constant information rate k/n =
Θ(1), where ρf = Θ(1), and pf = Θ(1).
Remark 3: The reduction for Corollary 2 is nearly identical
to that of Theorem 1, except we must now account for poly(k)
rounds where the adversary attempts to fool the decoder. An
identical argument uses Lemma 1 to that the probability of
succeeding in each individual round of priv-LDC-Game is
negligible. Since there are only polynomially many rounds the
the probability that the attacker succeeds in any of the rounds
is still negligible.
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B. Resoure-Bounded InsDel Locally Decodable Code Con-
struction
Next we use Theorem 2 with the resource-bounded Ham-
ming LDC of Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20] which
works for any class C that admits a safe function. A function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ is δ-safe for a class C of algorithms
if for all A ∈ C we have Pr[A(x) = f(x)] ≤ δ, where
the probability is taken over the random coins of A and the
selection of an input x ∈ {0, 1}n. The code construction of
[BKZ20] is in the (parallel) random oracle model, where the
encoder and decoder additionally have access to some random
oracle H. For security parameter λ and fixed negligible func-
tions ϑ1, ϑ2, their code has constant-rate, locality polylog(λ),
constant error-rate, success probability 1−ϑ1(λ), and security
ε ≤ ϑ2(λ) + q · δ, where q is an upper bound on the number
of oracle queries made by any algorithm in C.
In the (parallel) random oracle model one can provably
establish the existence of safe functions for many natural
classes of channels; e.g., space bounded or sequential time
bounded. As an example, if H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is a random
oracle then the function HT+1(·) is δ = q · T · 2−λ-safe
against the class of algorithms making at most q total queries
to H over at most T rounds. Similar results holds for the
classes of space-bounded or space-time bounded channels. The
class of sequentially bounded channels is motivated by the
observation that the depth of computation that the channel
performs is restricted in most natural settings; e.g., traveling
at the speed of light, it would take between 3 and 22 minutes
for a transmission from Mars to reach Earth (the exact time
would depend on the current orbital location of the planets).
Corollary 3: Let λ be a security parameter, let C be a class
of algorithms in the parallel random oracle model admitting
a δ-safe function, and let k = poly(λ). For random oracle H
there exists a binary code CHf [n, k, 2] that is a (ℓf , ρf , pf , εf ,C)-
InsDel LDC against class C, where ℓf = polylog(λ) · log4(n′),
ρf = Θ(1), pf = Θ(1), and εf ≤ ς(λ, n′)− q · δ. Here, q is an
upper bound on the total queries any algorithm in C makes to
H, ς is a fixed negligible function, and n′ is the length of a
word received by the decoder.
Remark 4: While the construction of [BKZ20] relies on
the random oracle model we stress that this dependence is
not inherent to our results. Given any standard model con-
struction of a Hamming LDC for resource bounded channels
we could similarly obtain a standard model InsDel LDC for
resource bounded channels by applying Theorem 2. Thus, it
is plausible that one could replace the random oracle model
assumption with, for example, the assumption that time-lock
puzzles [RSW96, BN00, GMPY11, MMV11, BGJ+16] exist.
In particular, Blocki, Kulkarni, and Zhou [BKZ20] provide
serveral examples of safe functions in various models to
construct resource-bounded Hamming LDCs. These include
safe functions secure in the parallel random oracle model, safe
functions which are secure against sequential time-bounded
adversaries, and safe functions based on graphs with suffi-
ciently large pebbling costs.
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